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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
ALVIE GROVER, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
CaseNo.20010262-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
APPELLATE JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction to hear this appeal is conferred upon the above-entitled Court by 
Section 78-2a-3(2)(f), Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Did the Trial Court err in denying Appellant's Motion to Withdraw his 
Guilty Plea? 
2. Was Defendant denied the right to effective assistance of counsel? 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. Section 77-13-6, Utah Code 
Annotated. 
Section 7, Article I, Utah Constitution. 
Amendment V, United States Constitution. 
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Amendments V and VI, United States Constitution. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Defendant was originally charged with Rape, a 1st Degree Felony. (R.l). The 
Defendant entered into a Plea Agreement under the terms of which he plead guilty to forcible 
sexual abuse, a 2nd Degree Felony. (R.30-31). The Defendant was sentenced to serve 1 to 15 years 
in the Utah State Prison. (R.32-38). The Defendant filed a motion to withdraw his guilty plea, and 
petition for determination of competency, claiming he was not competent at the time he entered 
into the Plea Agreement. (R.38-39). The trial court ultimately denied Defendant's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. (R. 119-125). The Defendant appeals said ruling. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On or about April 15, 1997, an Information was filed with the Fifth District Court, 
Washington County, State of Utah, charging Defendant with one count of Rape, a 1st Degree 
Felony. (R. 1). At Defendant's first appearance, a public defender, Odean Bowler, was appointed to 
represent him. (R. 7-8). On or about April 28, 1997, Defendant waived his preliminary hearing. 
(R.17-18). On or about June 5, 1997, Defendant entered into a Plea Agreement under the terms of 
which Defendant plead guilty to Forcible Sexual Abuse, a 2nd Degree Felony. (R.30-31). On or 
about June 6,1997, Judge James L. Shumate sentenced Defendant to serve 1 to 15 years in the Utah 
State Prison. (R. 32-38). 
On or about June 18, 1997, Defendant filed a Motion to Withdraw Plea and Petition 
for Determining Competence and Appointment of Alienist. (R. 38-39). A hearing was held on 
Defendant's motions on July 3, 1997. Defendant was not present because he had been transported 
to the Utah State Prison and was not transported to Washington County for the hearing. At the 
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hearing, the State's attorney, Brian G. Filter, stated that the State did not oppose Defendant's 
petition for appointment of alienist and order for appointment of alienists was executed by the 
court. (R. 43). 
On or about August 14, 1997, Defendant filed a Notice of Appeal. (R. 46-48). On 
or about September 23, 1997, Defendant filed an Amended Petition for Determining Competency 
and Appointment of Alienists. (R. 52). 
On or about October 7, 1997, a hearing was held before Judge G. Rand Beacham on 
Defendants' amended petition. Defendant was not transported and was not present at that hearing. 
Judge Beacham inquired of Defendant's counsel Mr. Bowler as to why another petition for 
appointment of alienists had been filed since the Judge had signed an order appointing alienists the 
previous July. Mr. Bowler told the court that Mr. Glover had not been evaluated pursuant to the 
court's previous order. The State's prosecutor, Brent Langston, told Judge Beacham he would make 
arrangements for an alienist to contact the Defendant at the prison. Judge Beacham ordered that an 
alienist interview the Defendant at the prison. (R. 55). 
On or about March 16, 1998, a remitittur from the Court of Appeals dismissing 
Defendant's appeal as untimely was filed with the Fifth District Court. (R. 56-57). 
On or about November 4, 1999, a review hearing was held before Judge Beacham. 
Defendant was present and represented by his attorney Odean Bowler. The court was informed that 
an alienist had never evaluated Defendant, contrary to the court's previous orders. Another review 
hearing was set for November 18, 1999, at which time the alienist was to be present and report on 
the progress of the evaluation. At that hearing, Defendant requested new counsel, which was 
denied by the court. (R. 69-70). 
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On or about November 18, 1999, the matter was once again before the court for 
review hearing. At that hearing, an alienist, John Moyes, appeared and asked the court for 
additional time to prepare a report for the court. Defendant renewed his request for new counsel 
and the court dismissed Mr. Bowler and appointed Douglas D. Terry to represent Mr. Grover. No 
reports from any alienist have ever been filed with the trial court. (R. 72-73). 
On or about February 6, 2001, Defendant's motion to withdraw plea was finally 
heard by the court. Defendant's grounds for his motion to withdraw his guilty plea were that at the 
time of the entry of his plea, he was not competent to do so. The purpose for the petition for 
competency evaluation and appointment of alienist was to determine if Defendant was competent at 
the time he entered his plea. At the hearing on Defendant's motion for withdrawal of plea, the court 
heard evidence that no competency evaluation was ever performed by any alienist, through no fault 
of Defendant. At the hearing, Defendant testified that his abuse of drugs caused or contributed to 
serious mental problems, which prevented him from understanding the consequences of his guilty 
plea. The court reviewed the videotape of the Defendant's plea agreement hearing. The court 
found that Defendant had not shown good cause as to why he should be allowed to withdraw his 
guilty plea and its Memorandum Decision filed February 28, 2001, denied Defendant's motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. (R.l 19-125). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Subsequent to the entry of Defendant's Plea Agreement and his sentencing hearing, 
the Defendant raised the issue of his competency to enter into the Plea Agreement. The court 
ordered an evaluation to determine the Defendant's competency at the time he entered into the Plea 
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Agreement. Through no fault of the Defendant, the evaluation was never performed as ordered. 
The trial court made specific findings that the Defendant's court appointed trial counsel was 
ineffective. The trial court erred in denying Defendant's motion to withdraw his guilty plea. 
ARGUMENT 
1. The Trial Court Erred in Denying Defendant's Motion to Withdraw his Guilty 
Plea. 
When the Defendant filed his motion to withdraw his guilty plea on June 18, 1997, 
the motion was timely. The grounds for the motion were that Defendant was not competent to 
enter his guilty plea when it was accepted by the court on June 5, 1997. Defendant filed a Petition 
for Determining Competence and Appointment of Alienists on the same date he filed his motion to 
withdraw his guilty plea. Defendant took the position that he did not believe he was legally 
competent on the date he entered his guilty plea. 
Defendant's Motion for Determination of Competency and Appointment of 
Alienists was heard July 3, 1997. Defendant was not present at that hearing since he had been 
transported to the Utah State Prison, pursuant to his sentence and no transportation order had been 
signed for the hearing on that date. The State did not oppose Defendant's petition, and Judge 
Beacham signed an order appointing an alienist to determine the competency of the Defendant. 
In spite of Judge Beacham's order appointing an alienist to determine the 
Defendant's competency at the time he entered his guilty plea, no alienist ever evaluated the 
Defendant to determine his competency as of that date. The reason the Court's order was not 
followed is somewhat unclear from the record, however, Defendant claims it was due to the 
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ineffective assistance of his counsel, which is argued below. At any rate, through no fault of the 
Defendant, the Court's order appointing an alienist was never obeyed. 
On February 6, 2001, Defendant's Motion to Withdraw his Guilty Plea was finally 
heard by the Court, thirty-four months after the motion was filed. Judge Beacham ruled from the 
only evidence he had before him, i.e., the Defendant's written Plea Agreement and the videotape of 
the Plea Agreement Hearing. Judge Beacham ruled that Defendant had failed to show sufficient 
grounds under Utah Code Annotated, Section 77-13-6(2)(a), to warrant the withdrawal of his guilty 
plea. The Defendant's argument at the hearing and before the Court of Appeals is that he has been 
denied his right to due process of law by allowing his plea of guilty to stand in the absence of an 
evaluation, duly ordered by the trial court, to determine his competency at the time of the entry of 
his guilty plea. 
In State v. Tarnawiecki, 2000 UT App. 186, 5 P.3d 122, the Utah Court of Appeals 
stated that Utah's Appellate Courts have emphasized that "Rule 11(a) 'places on the trial courts the 
burden of ensuring that the constitutional and Rule 11(a) requirements are complied with when a 
guilty plea is entered.'" (Quoting State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309, 1312, (Utah 1987)). The court 
in Tarnawiecki further stated "importantly, strict compliance, rather than substantial compliance, 
with Rule 11 is required when accepting a guilty plea. Id, at 187. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Gibbons, holding that trial judges are responsible for 
strict compliance with Rule 11(e) stated, "Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of 
ensuring that constitutional and Rule 11(e) requirements are complied with when a guilty plea is 
entered. Id. at 1312. This burden "demands the utmost solicitude of which courts are capable in 
canvassing the matter with the accused to make sure he has full understanding of what the plea 
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connotes and of its consequence." Id. (quoting Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 243-44, 89 S.Ct. 
1709,1712-13,23 L.Ed.2d 274 (1969)). 
Under Rule 11, Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure, the court cannot accept a plea 
until the court has found that the plea is knowing and voluntary. In order to make such a finding, 
the trial court must enter into a colloquy with the Defendant, or receive and affidavit, to determine 
if the Defendant has knowledge of his constitutional rights and the fact that he is substantially 
giving up those rights when entering a guilty plea. 
It appears from the record, and indeed Judge Beacham found, that Rule 11 had been 
complied with at the time Defendant entered his guilty plea. However, Defendant's competency to 
enter into the guilty plea was called into question when he filed his Motion to Withdraw his Guilty 
Plea and Petition for Competency Determination. The State, while not taking a position as to the 
competency issue itself, at least agreed that the issue existed when it did not object to the Court 
ordering the appointment of alienists to examine the issue. The fact is, that the issue as to the 
Defendant's competency at the time he entered his guilty plea was raised, the Court ordered an 
evaluation to determine the issue, and an evaluation was never performed. There is nothing in the 
record to indicate that the failure to obtain the ordered evaluation was the fault of the Defendant, 
and Judge Beacham specifically ruled that it was not. (R. 122). 
Section 77-15-4 Utah Code Annotated, states that he Court may raise the issue of 
Defendant's competency at any time. Section 77-15-5, Utah Code Annotated states that if a 
petition is filed raising the issue of the Defendant's competency, the Court shall stay all 
proceedings, pending the determination of competency. Until the issue of Defendant's competency 
at the time he entered his plea is determined, the Court should not proceed further. Until and unless 
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the Court makes a finding with respect to the Defendant's competency at the time he entered his 
guilty plea, the Court cannot accept his guilty plea because the Court cannot make Rule 11 findings 
that the guilty plea was entered knowingly and voluntarily. The Court erred in denying the 
Defendant's Motion to Withdraw his Guilty Plea because the Court cannot make such findings 
without a determination by alienists that the Defendant was competent to enter his plea. 
In State v. Maguire, 957 P.2d 598 (Utah 1998), the Utah Supreme Court addressed 
the issue of what to do when the denial of a post-conviction motion to withdraw plea is reversed 
and remanded, to the trial court. Quoting State v. Powell, 957 P.2d 595 (Utah 1998) the Court 
stated that "[w]hen an order denying a motion to withdraw a plea is reversed on appeal, the 
appellate court does not 'set aside1 the conviction. Rather, the appellate court merely overtruns the 
trial court's order and remands the case to allow the defendant to withdraw his plea if he still desires 
to do so." Id. at 600. 
2. Defendant was denied the effective assistance of counsel. 
Defendant claims that his first appointed attorney, Odean Bowler was ineffective, in 
that Mr. Bowler did not ensure that the competency evaluation was performed as ordered by the 
Court. The standard by which trial court counsel's effectiveness is weighed in order to determine 
whether it is constitutionally adequate has been described in many Utah cases. In State v. Gallegos, 
967 P.2d 973 (Utah Ct. App. 1998), the court held that "to bring a successful ineffective assistance 
of counsel claim, a defendant must show that trial counsel's performance was deficient in that it fell 
below an objective standard of reasonableness, and that the deficient performance prejudiced the 
outcome of the trial." The Gallegos case quotes Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 
2052, 80 L.Ed. 2d. 674 (1984), stating that "to show prejudice under the second component of the 
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test, a defendant must proffer sufficient evidence to support a reasonable probability that, but for 
counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different." (Quoting 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). 
In this case, it is difficult to determine what the outcome would have been had the 
competency evaluation been performed as ordered by the Court. Nor is it clear from the record that 
the competency evaluation was not performed due specifically to the inaction of Defendant's 
appointed counsel. However, it is clear from the record that many months went by with no action 
on the part of Defendant's counsel to follow up the Court's order and take the necessary steps to 
have the competency evaluation performed, or at least find out why it had not been performed and 
report that information to the Court. Because we do not know, nor will we ever know at this point, 
whether or not the alienists would have found the Defendant competent to enter his guilty plea, it is 
certainly prejudicial to the Defendant that the alienist evaluation was never performed. The 
Defendant asserts that the inaction on the part of hiscounsel to see that the Court's order for a 
competency evaluation be performed for over 29 months falls below the objective standard of 
reasonableness. The trial court so found in the November 18, 1999, hearing in which Mr. Bowler 
was released as counsel by the Court. In that hearing, Judge Beacham made the following 
statement: 
Alright. I've reviewed this and considered this for the last two weeks. And I have 
never heard a reasonable explanation for Mr. Bowler for reasons that this situation 
developed. If this were a situation involving collection of an account, it would not 
be so serious. But where it involves Mr. Grover's freedom and his liberty, it's a 
horrible situation. It is most certainly ineffective assistance of counsel. It's 
absolutely no assistance of counsel, other than the appeal. But nothing being done 
on the motion to withdraw the plea, nothing being done with regard to an alienist. It 
is most definitely absence of effective counsel. And Mr. Grover now has been 
incarcerated for two and a half years with nothing being done on that. 
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Mr. Bowler, this is not acceptable under any standard. It's not excusable under any 
standard. It is something that should never ever occur. Regardless of what 
problems there are and the difficult load that a public defender carries, a person 
cannot be left incarcerated without a response, without action being taken, without 
any request for hearings, without any request to enforce the order appointing an 
alienist, without any communication back to the defendant regarding the issues. 
This is totally unacceptable and clearly below any minimal standard for 
representation of a defendant. (Transcript of November 18, 1999, Motion Hearing 
at Page 10) 
CONCLUSION 
Upon the foregoing grounds, Defendant respectfully requests that the Trial Court's 
Order Denying Defendant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea be overturned and that the case be 
remanded to the trial court ordering that the Defendant be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea, if he 
still desires to do so. 
DATED this 1° day of January, 2002. 
!sL 
Douglas D. Terry 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I do hereby certify that on this *g day of January, 2002,1 did personally mail 
true and correct copies of the above and foregoing document to: 
J. Frederic Voros, Jr. 
Assistant Attorney General 
P. O. Box 140854 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Alvie Grover 
Utah State Prison 
P. O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84404 
JIL 
Douglas D. Terry 
10 
ADDENDUM 
No Addendum is necessary. 
